Threat Analysis Group

TAG Bulletin: Q3 2020



This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q3 2020. It was last updated on October 16, 2020.

July

We terminated 1 advertising account and 7 YouTube channels as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation linked to Ecuador. The campaign was linked to the PR firm Estraterra, and posted content in Spanish about former Ecuador government employees. These findings are consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.


We terminated 299 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China. These channels mostly uploaded spammy content in Chinese about music, entertainment, and lifestyle. A very small subset uploaded content in Chinese about COVID-19 and current events in Hong Kong. These findings are consistent with our previous reports in the Q2 TAG bulletin.

August

We terminated 1,846 YouTube channels and 5 blogs as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China. These channels mostly uploaded spammy content in Chinese about music, entertainment, and lifestyle. A small subset of the channels uploaded content in English about current events in Hong Kong and the U.S. response to COVID-19. These findings are consistent with our previous reports in the Q2 TAG bulletin.

We terminated 8 YouTube channels as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation linked to Yemen. This domestic campaign posted content in Arabic in support of the Yemeni government. This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.

September

We terminated 4 YouTube channels as part of our actions against a coordinated influence operation. The campaign was linked to a U.S.-based PR firm, CLS Strategies, and posted content in Spanish about Mexican elections. This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.

We terminated 1,628 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China. These channels mostly uploaded spammy content in English and Chinese about music, entertainment, and lifestyle. A small subset of the channels uploaded content in English about current events in the U.S. and the U.S. response to COVID-19. These findings are consistent with our previous reports in the Q2 TAG bulletin.