Updates from Threat Analysis Group (TAG)

Threat Analysis Group

TAG Bulletin: Q3 2023

Oct 05, 2023

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Shane Huntley
Shane Huntley
Senior Director Threat Analysis Group

This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q3 2023. It was last updated on November 8, 2023.

July 2023

  • We disabled 3 AdSense accounts and blocked 12 domains from eligibility to appear on Google News surfaces and Discover as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Slovakia. The campaigns were sharing content in Slovak, Czech and English supportive of Russia and critical of the West.
  • We terminated 22 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Uzbekistan. The campaign was sharing content in Uzbeki language that was supportive of Uzbekistan President Shavkat Mirziyoyev.
  • We terminated 2 Youtube channels, disabled 2 AdSense Accounts, and blocked 19 domains from eligibility to appear on Google News surfaces and Discover as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Togo and Burkina Faso. Our findings are similar to findings reported by Meta.
  • We terminated 7,467 YouTube channels and 183 Blogger blogs as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). These channels mostly uploaded spammy content in Chinese about music, entertainment and lifestyle. A very small subset uploaded content in Chinese and English about China and U.S. foreign affairs. These findings are consistent with our previous reports.

August

  • We terminated 327 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Mexico. The campaign was sharing content in Spanish that was supportive of the Morena party and Senator Ricardo Monreal.
  • We terminated 9 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Iran. The campaign was sharing religious content in Bengali, Pashto and Arabic.
  • We terminated 3 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was linked to the Internet Research Agency (IRA) and was sharing content in Russian that was supportive of Russia and critical of Ukraine, NATO and the United States.
  • We terminated 2 YouTube channels and blocked 33 domains from eligibility to appear on Google News surfaces and Discover as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was sharing content in German, English, French and Arabic about a variety of topics, including content supportive of Russia and critical of Ukraine and the West.
  • We blocked 12 domains from eligibility to appear on Google News surfaces and Discover as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.
  • We terminated 200 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was linked to a Russian consulting firm and was sharing content in Russian that was supportive of Russia and critical of Ukraine and the West.
  • We terminated 92 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Azerbaijan. The campaign was sharing content in Azerbaijani that was supportive of Azerbaijan and critical of Armenia and critics of the Azerbaijani government.
  • We blocked 8 domains from eligibility to appear on Google News surfaces and Discover as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to India. The campaign was linked to the Association of Billion Minds and was sharing content in English and Hindi.
  • We terminated 37 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Vietnam. The campaign was sharing content in Vietnamese that was supportive of the Vietnamese government and its policies.
  • We terminated 5,534 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China. The coordinated inauthentic network mostly uploaded spammy content in Chinese about music, entertainment and lifestyle. A very small subset uploaded content in Chinese and English about China and U.S. foreign affairs. These findings are consistent with our previous reports.

September

  • We terminated 53 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Azerbaijan. The campaign was sharing content in Azerbaijani that was supportive of Azerbaijan and critical of Armenia and critics of the government of Azerbaijan.
  • We blocked 2 domains from eligibility to appear on Google News surfaces and Discover as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Iran. The campaign was sharing content in Turkish on current events in the Middle East that was supportive of Iran and Palestine and critical of the West, Israel, and the US. Our findings are similar to findings reported by Meta.
  • We terminated 40 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Poland. The campaigns were sharing content in Polish about the upcoming Polish election that were critical of pro-EU parties and politicians.
  • We terminated 12 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was sharing content in Russian about the Russia-Ukraine war that was supportive of Russia and critical of Ukraine and the West.
  • We terminated 1 YouTube channel and blocked 1 domain from eligibility to appear on Google News surfaces and Discover as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The campaign was linked to Shanghai Haixun Technology Co., Ltd and was sharing content in English that was supportive of China and critical of the US.
  • We terminated 14 YouTube channels and 3 Blogger blogs as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The campaigns were sharing content in English and Chinese criticizing Chinese dissidents, as well as content critical of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). Our findings are similar to findings reported by ASPI.
  • We terminated 5,783 YouTube channels and 31 Blogger blogs as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The coordinated inauthentic network mostly uploaded spammy content in Chinese about music, entertainment and lifestyle. A very small subset uploaded content in Chinese and English about China and U.S. foreign affairs. These findings are consistent with our previous reports.
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