Updates from Threat Analysis Group (TAG)
Threat Analysis Group

TAG Bulletin: Q4 2020

This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q4 2020. It was last updated on November 17, 2020.

October

  • We terminated 12 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. This campaign uploaded content in Russian supporting the Russian military and criticizing U.S. military involvement in Japan. We received leads from Facebook that supported us in this investigation.

  • We terminated 2 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Myanmar. This domestic campaign posted content focused on elections and supporting the Union Solidarity and Development Party, (USDP). This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.

  • We terminated 35 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Azerbaijan. This domestic campaign was linked to the New Azerbaijan Party and posted content supporting the Azerbaijani government and promoting Azerbaijani nationalism. This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.

  • We terminated 26 YouTube channels and 1 blog as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. This campaign uploaded content primarily in Russian and included news clips and military videos supporting the Russian government. We received leads from the FBI that supported us in this investigation. This campaign was consistent with similar findings reported by Facebook.

  • We terminated 2 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into a coordinated influence operation linked to Iran. This campaign uploaded content in Farsi and Arabic that was critical of the Saudi government. 

  • We terminated 7,479 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China. These channels mostly uploaded spammy content in Chinese about music, entertainment, and cooking. A very small subset uploaded content in English about U.S. protests and ongoing wildfires. We received leads from FireEye and Graphika that supported us in this investigation. These findings are consistent with our previous reports in the Q2 and Q3 TAG bulletins.