TAG Bulletin: Q3 2022

This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q3 2022. It was last updated on October 26, 2022.

July

• We terminated 7 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was linked to a Russian consulting firm and was sharing content in Russian that was supportive of Russia and critical of Ukraine and the U.S.
• We terminated 7 YouTube channels and 3 AdSense accounts as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China. The campaign was sharing content in English and Chinese that was supportive of the Chinese semiconductor and tech industries and critical of the U.S. semiconductor industry and U.S. sanctions on Chinese tech companies.
• We terminated 2,150 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China. These channels mostly uploaded spammy content in Chinese about music, entertainment, and lifestyle. A very small subset uploaded content in Chinese and English about China and U.S. foreign affairs. These findings are consistent with our previous reports.

August

• We terminated 10 YouTube channels and blocked 120 domains from eligibility to appear on Google News surfaces and Discover as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China. The campaign was linked to a Chinese PR firm named Shanghai Haixun Technology Co., Ltd. and was sharing content in English, Chinese, Russian, Ukrainian, Thai, Hindi, French, Arabic, Italian, Vietnamese and Korean that was critical of international news coverage of Xinjiang, the United States and its relationship with Taiwan, and high profile critics of the Chinese government. We received leads from Mandiant that supported us in this investigation.
• We terminated 12 YouTube channels, 4 Ads accounts, and 2 Blogger blogs and blocked 3 domains from eligibility to appear on Google News surfaces and Discover as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to the United States. The campaign was sharing content in English, Arabic, Farsi, and Russian that was promoting U.S. foreign affairs. We received leads from Twitter that supported us in this investigation.
• We terminated 15 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Sudan. The campaign was sharing content in Arabic that was supportive of the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces and their leader Hemetti. We received leads from Twitter that supported us in this investigation.
• We terminated 3 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was linked to the media outlet News Front and was sharing content in English and German that was supportive of Russia and critical of the United States. We received leads from Twitter that supported us in this investigation.
• We terminated 1 AdSense account and blocked 1 domain from eligibility to appear on Google News surfaces and Discover as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Turkey. The campaign was sharing content in Turkish that was supportive of Turkey’s AK Party. We received leads from Twitter that supported us in this investigation.
• We terminated 12 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was linked to a Russian consulting firm and was sharing content in Russian that was supportive of Russia and the Russian military and critical of NATO, Ukraine, and the West. We received leads from Twitter that supported us in this investigation.
• We terminated 15 YouTube channels, 2 AdSense accounts, and 1 Blogger blog as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Vietnam. The campaign was sharing content in Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and German that was supportive of Russia and critical of Ukraine and China. We believe this operation was financially motivated.
• We terminated 1 YouTube channel and 1 Ads account and blocked 1 domain from eligibility to appear on Google News surfaces and Discover as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was sharing content in Russian that was critical of the United States, the EU, Ukraine, and NATO.
• We terminated 1104 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China. These channels mostly uploaded spammy content in Chinese about music, entertainment, and lifestyle. A very small subset uploaded content in Chinese and English about China and U.S. foreign affairs. These findings are consistent with our previous reports.

September

• We terminated 1 AdSense account and blocked 4 domains from eligibility to appear on Google News surfaces and Discover as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to North Macedonia. The campaign was sharing sensational content in English that was about a variety of topics including U.S. and European current events. We believe this operation was financially motivated.
• We terminated 5 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Myanmar. The campaign was sharing content in Burmese that was critical of the People’s Defense Force of Myanmar.
• We terminated 3 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was linked to the Internet Research Agency (IRA) and was sharing content in French that was supportive of Russian policy objectives in Libya. We received leads from the FBI that supported us in this investigation.
• We blocked 1 domain from eligibility to appear on Google News surfaces and Discover as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Iran. The campaign was sharing content in Arabic that was critical of the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain.
• We terminated 6957 YouTube channels and 144 Blogger blogs as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China. These channels and blogs mostly uploaded spammy content in Chinese about music, entertainment, and lifestyle. A very small subset uploaded content in Chinese and English about China and U.S. foreign affairs. These findings are consistent with our previous reports.