Updates from Threat Analysis Group (TAG)

Threat Analysis Group

TAG Bulletin: Q4 2021

Dec 02, 2021

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Shane Huntley
Shane Huntley
Senior Director, Threat Analysis Group

This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q4 2021. It was last updated on February 7, 2022.

October

  • We terminated 9 YouTube channels and 1 ads account as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Vietnam. The campaign uploaded conspiracy theory content in English and Korean. We believe this operation was financially motivated
  • We terminated 4 AdSense accounts and blocked 22 domains from eligibility to appear on Google News surfaces and Discover as part of our investigation into a reported coordinated influence operation linked to India. The campaign uploaded a variety of news content in English to domains that were designed to look as if they were independent news outlets in various US states and European countries. We believe this operation was financially motivated. We received leads from the FBI that supported us in this investigation.
  • We terminated 37 YouTube channels and 4 blogs as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Sudan. The campaign uploaded content in Arabic that was supportive of the Sudanese military. Our findings are similar to findings reported by Facebook.
  • We terminated 3 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Uganda. The campaign uploaded content in English that was critical of Ugandan opposition political parties. Our findings are similar to findings reported by Twitter.
  • We terminated 3,311 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China. These channels mostly uploaded spammy content in Chinese about music, entertainment, and lifestyle. A very small subset uploaded content in Chinese and English about China’s COVID-19 vaccine efforts and social issues in the U.S. These findings are consistent with our previous reports.

November

  • We terminated 86 YouTube channels and 3 blogs as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Nicaragua. The campaign posted content in Spanish that was supportive of the Nicaraguan government and critical of opposition political parties. Our findings are similar to findings reported by Facebook.
  • We terminated 15,368 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China. These channels mostly uploaded spammy content in Chinese about music, entertainment, and lifestyle. A very small subset uploaded content in Chinese and English about China’s COVID-19 vaccine efforts and social issues in the U.S. These findings are consistent with our previous reports. The increased takedown volume compared to prior months is the result of adjustments made to our detection model, and we do not believe it reflects an increase in activity by this campaign.

December

  • We terminated 1 YouTube channel as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Iran. The campaign uploaded content in English that was supportive of US politicians.
  • We terminated 15 YouTube channels and 1 Blogger blog as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Palestine. The campaign uploaded content in Arabic that was critical of Israel and supportive of Palestine and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Our findings are similar to findings reported by Meta.
  • We terminated 10 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Belarus. The campaign uploaded content in Arabic that negatively characterized the treatment and conditions of Muslim migrants in Belarus. Our findings are similar to findings reported by Meta.
  • We terminated 2 YouTube channels and 1 Ads account as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations. The campaign uploaded content in French that was supportive of candidates in past elections in the Central African Republic.
  • We terminated 7 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was linked to the Russian news agency ANNA News and was uploading content in Russian that was about military activity in the Middle East. We received leads from Miburo Solutions that supported us in this investigation.
  • We terminated 99 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was linked to a Russian consulting firm and was posting content in Russian that was supportive of the United Russia party and critical of its opposition.
  • We terminated 8 YouTube channels as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign was uploading content in Russian that was critical of Russian opposition parties.
  • We terminated 1 YouTube channel as part of our investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia. The campaign uploaded content in English pertaining to military conflicts in the Middle East. We received leads from Miburo Solutions that supported us in this investigation.
  • We terminated 5460 YouTube channels as part of our ongoing investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to China. These channels mostly uploaded spammy content in Chinese about music, entertainment, and lifestyle. A very small subset uploaded content in Chinese and English about China’s COVID-19 vaccine efforts and social issues in the U.S. These findings are consistent with our previous reports.
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